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CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS - ANALYSIS
OF THE RECENT COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION IN BROWN V. NEW YORK; THE
RESOLVED AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Martin A. Schwartz
Professor Barry Latzer:
Our next presentation raises what I believe is called a federal
level Bivens action issue; that is, can one sue, civilly of course,
for damages based on violations of the state constitution? We
know that this can be done at the Federal Constitutional level. To
what extent can this be done at the state constitutional level?
Our presenter is Professor Martin A. Schwartz, who is a
professor here at Touro Law Center. Professor Schwartz is a
City College graduate. He received his law degree Magna Cum
Laude from Brooklyn Law School and an LL.M. from New York
University. He has had an active federal practice, including the
honor of arguing three cases before the United States Supreme
Court.
He is the author of a semi-monthly column in the New York
Law Journal entitled "Public Interest Law" and he has lectured
for the Practicing Law Institute. He was a member of the New
York State Bar Association Committee on State Constitutional
Law and he is co-author of a multi-volume treatise on Section
1983 civil rights litigation entitled "Section 1983 Litigation:
Claims and Defenses." Having completed a single-volume
treatise, I can well appreciate the monumental effort that goes
into multi-volumes. This is the five-volume one, and growing I
am sure. Obviously Professor Schwartz has great expertise in
civil lawsuits at the federal level. We hope to encourage him to
turn even more toward the same type of suits at the state court




Professor Martin A. Schwartz:
Thank you, Barry. You may not know this, but we are here
for an anniversary. It was one year ago almost to the day,
November 19, 1996, that the New York State Court of Appeals
decided a case of major importance, Brown v. State of New York.I
In Brown, the New York Court of Appeals held that individuals
may assert claims for compensatory damages for violations of
their rights protected by the equal protection2 and search and
seizure3 guarantees of the New York State Constitution. The
court held that these claims could be asserted against the State of
New York in the Court of Claims5 and that they invoke
respondeat superior liability. Judge Simons wrote the opinion
for the court.7
The Bill of Rights of the New York State Constitution goes
back to 1821.8 However, the equal protection and search and
seizure clauses did not find their way into the constitution until
1938.1 There is another anniversary that we could be celebrating,
which is the 150th Anniversary of the New York State Court of
'89 N.Y.2d 172, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 52 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1996).
2 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof." Id.
3 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This section provides in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable case .... " Id.
4 Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 176, 674 N.E.2d at 1131, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
5 Id. at 197, 674 N.E.2d at 1144, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
6Id. at 195-6, 674 N.E.2d at 1143-44, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 237-38
7 On the eve of his retirement, Judge Richard D. Simons wrote the majority
opinion. Id. at 175, 674 N.E.2d at 1131, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 225. Chief Judge
Judith Kaye and Judges Titone, Smith, and Ciparick concurred with Judge
Simons. Id. at 213, 674 N.E.2d at 1154, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 248. Judge
Bellacosa was the lone dissenter. Id. at 196, 674 N.E.2d at 1144, 652
N.Y.S.2d at 238. Judge Levine took no part in this decision. Id. at 213, 674
N.E.2d at 1154, 652 N.Y.S. 2d at 248.
8 PETER J. GALIE, THE NEW YORK STATE CONsTITUTION 34 (1997).
9 Id. at 56.
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Appeals. 10 Yet it was not until last year's decision in the Brown
case that the New York Court of Appeals had ever dealt with this
issue." So I think that the Brown decision is truly a landmark
decision - an opinion of first impression. 12 This is the first time
that the Court of Appeals has recognized claims for damages for
rights guaranteed by the New York State Constitution."3
I think that the issue of remedies for constitutional violations
involves a very basic separation of powers question. Is this
question of remedies principally a question for a legislative body,
or is it principally a question for the judiciary? State courts
around the country have differed with respect to this issue.'
I think that in order to understand the significance of the
decision in Brown and future issues facing the New York Court
of Appeals, it is instructive to go back and look to see how the
question of remedies for federal constitutional violations has
developed in this country. When individuals claim that their
federal constitutional rights have been violated by state or local
officials, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the statutory authorization
for the claim of relief.'" This Congressional authorization dates
'" Evan A. Davis, New York Court of Appeals Roundup, the 15C-
Anniversary, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 9, 1997, at 3. The New York Court of Appeals
was established by article XXIV of the New York State Constitution of 1846.
See FRANcIs BERGAN, THE HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
1847-1932 (1985). The court consisted of eight Justices, four of whom were
elected statewide and four of whom were appointed from the state supreme
court. Id. at 18-26. The Judiciary Amendment of 1869 reformed the court
and in 1870, a new court of seven elected judges began hearing cases. Id.
" Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 196, 674 N.E.2d at 1144, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
12 Id.
13 id.
'" See generally J. FRIESEN, STATE CoNsTrrtTIoNAL LAw, § 7-7(a) - 7-
7(a)(15) (1996) (discussing decisions from several states that support a private
cause of action for violations of state constitutional rights).
's See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statue, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction on
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
1998 659
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back to 1871, when the original version of Section 1983 was
adopted. 16
How about violations of federal constitutional rights by federal
officials? When an individual seeks to sue a federal official for a
violation of federal constitutional rights, Section 1983 is not
available. 17 Section 1983 only covers actions under color of state
law; of course, federal officials act under color of federal law."8
Maybe this is just one of those curiosities in the history of
American law, but the Congress has never enacted a counterpart
statute to Section 1983 that authorizes claims for damages for
federal constitutional violations against federal officials."
However, in 1971 the United States Supreme Court took the issue
into its own hands in its landmark decision in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.0
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that officials
acting in abuse of their authority who deprive an individual of a constitutional
right may be liable under § 1983); Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (concluding that local government could be held
responsible under § 1983 where its "official policy is responsible for a
deprivation of right protected by the constitution"); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1 (1980) (holding that §1983 may be used to vindicate a violation of a
federal statutory right).
16 For a historical background of this statute, see generally M. SCHWARTZ &
J. KiRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFINSES, §1.3 (3d ed.
1997). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has its origins in § 1 the Civil Rights Act of 1871, a
congressional response to the failure of the states to prevent widespread
violence committed by the Klu Klux Klan. Id. at § 9. The Act was enacted
"for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. (quoting Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 354 (1979)). See also Marshall
S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60
NORTHWEST U. L. REv. 277 (1965).
17 See Schwartz, supra note 16, at § 5.7.
18 See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
19 See Martin A. Schwartz, Recognizing Damage Suits Under New York
Constitution, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 18, 1997, at 3 (stating that "there is no
counterpart to § 1983 that authorizes the assertion of claimed violations of
federally protected rights against federal officials and agencies.").
20 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, six federal narcotics agents entered into
Bivens' apartment without an arrest warrant and arrested him on drug charges
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Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held that individuals
have the right to assert claims for damages for violations of their
Fourth Amendment21 rights against federal officials, who, in this
case, were federal law-enforcement officials.2 The Bivens claim
was implied from the Constitution itself, the Fourth Amendment.
In reaching his conclusion, Justice Brennan said "[h]istorically,
damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an
invasion of personal interests in liberty. "23
Justice Harlan wrote a very influential concurring opinion."
He stressed the point that people like Bivens, who claim that
federal law-enforcement agents engaged in conduct that violated
their Fourth Amendment protections, do not have a remedy
against the federal government because the federal government is
protected by sovereign immunity." Typically, they can not seek
prospective relief; they do not have standing to get an injunction
because these are typically "one-shot" wrongs and they are unable
to show sufficient probability of its happening again. 26 So,
Justice Harlan said, "for people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages
or nothing." 27 It is either this monetary remedy or we have to say
"too bad - the law simply does not give you a remedy."
without probable cause. Id. at 389. After handcuffing him in front of his wife
and children and threatening to arrest his entire family, the federal agents
searched his entire apartment. Id. Thereafter, Bivens was booked,
interrogated and subjected to a strip search. Id. Eventually, all charges
against him were dropped and he sued the federal agents in federal district
court seeking damages for violations of his constitutional rights, claiming that
he suffered "great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a
result of the agents' unlawful conduct." Id. at 389-90.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated..
." Id.
2 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
3Id. at 395.
24 Id. at 398 (Harlan, J., concurring).





How has the Bivens doctrine developed?2" In Davis v.
Passman,29 the Court extended the Bivens doctrine to a gender
discrimination claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment?0 The plaintiff in the case was a woman named
Shirley Davis who worked as a legislative assistant to
Congressman Otto E. Passman.31 Congressman Passman said
something that I am sure he has regretted ever since. He said
something like "this is a job for a man."32 The next sentence
was probably "you are fired." I am not sure that this actually
happened, but maybe her reply was "see you in court." The
United States Supreme Court held that she had the right to assert
her claim for damages." This is under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
The next year, in a case called Carlson v. Green,m the Court
held that a prisoner had the right to assert a claim for damages
for an alleged violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. When this decision came
See Schwartz, supra note 16, at §1.4 (providing a discussion of the Bivens
doctrine).
29442 U.S. 228 (1979).
30 Id. at 248.
11 Id. at 230. Shirley Davis instituted a lawsuit against her employer, United
States Congressman Otto E. Passman, for damages on the basis of gender
discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
32 Id. at 230 n. 3. In a letter that Congressman Passman sent to Shirley Davis
he stated "You are able, energetic and a very hard worker .... [h]owever, on
account of the unusually heavy work load in my Washington Office, and the
diversity of the job, I concluded that it was essential that the understudy to my
Administrative Assistant be a man." Id.
33 Id. at 242 (reasoning that victims of constitutional violations such as
plaintiff "have no effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these
rights, [and] must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts.").
34 446 U.S. 14 (1980). In Carlson, a prisoner's mother brought suit on
behalf of her son's estate, alleging that federal prison officials were responsible
for the death of her son because they violated their constitutional duty to
provide him with proper medical care after he suffered an asthma attack. Id.
at 16.
31 Id. at 18-19 (approving a Bivens remedy against federal prison official
charged with due process and eighth amendment violations). See U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be
[Vol 14
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down, it was seen as especially important because, unlike Bivens
and Davis where the plaintiff had no other remedy, in this ease
the United States Supreme Court recognized the claim for
damages even though the prisoner had an alternative remedy,
namely a remedy under the federal Tort Claims Act.36 A closely
divided Supreme Court said that the availability of this alternative
federal statutory remedy did not negate the federal constitutional
remedyY
However, after recognizing Bivens claims in these first three
cases, Bivens, Davis and Carlson, the Supreme Court
dramatically changed course and rejected the Bivens claim in the
last five cases that raised the issue. In some of these cases, the
claim for damages under the Federal Constitution was rejected
because Congress had enacted some alternative federal statutory
remedy. 9 In other cases the Bivens remedy was rejected even
when there was no alternative remedy, because the Supreme
Court found "special circumstances" justifying denial of the
remedy.' Two of the cases that used this doctrine were cases in
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. (1994).
37 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19-20. In Carlson, the Court recognized the Bivens
claim despite the available remedy of the Federal Torts Claim Act. Id. The
Court rejected the assertion that the Federal Torts Claim Act preempted an
implied damages remedy, reasoning that legislation may defeat a Bivens claim
only if Congress provided "an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared
to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as
equally effective." Id.
I FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S.
412 (1988); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Bush v. Lucas,
462 U.S. 296 (1983); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
39 See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 420 (refusing to permit an action for damages
under the Due Process Clause related to improper denial of entitlement to
Social Security disability benefits, in light of comprehensive administrative
scheme established by Congress for correction of errors in Social Security
Administration); Bush, 462 U.S. at 390 (finding that Congress' provision of an
alternative remedy may expressly or implicitly foreclose the courts' exercise of
power).
40 See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683-4 (holding that a Bivens remedy was not
available, even against civilian government personnel, when the alleged
1998
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which the claim for damages grew out of military operations.4' In
FDIC v. Meyer,42 the Court held that the Bivens damage remedy
may be asserted only against a federal official in the official's
personal capacity. 3 It is not a claim, the Court held, that may be
asserted against the federal government or a federal agency."
This is so even where, as in a case like FDIC v. Meyer, Congress
has waived the sovereign immunity of the particular federal
agency .45
If one stops for a moment and looks at this whole picture of
how the Bivens doctrine started and where it is today, I think that
it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the United States
Supreme Court has shifted its philosophy. It originally took the
position that the Bivens doctrine is a presumptively available
remedy. However, today the Supreme Court seems to take the
position that the Bivens remedy is a presumptively unavailable
remedy.46 I think this is very significant in terms of how the
United States Supreme Court looks at this issue. I think it shifted
from viewing the issue of remedies for constitutional violations
from an issue of primary concern of the federal judiciary, to its
present position, which seems to view it as principally a question
of legislative policy and of legislative judgment for the
Congress .47
It is against this background of Section 1983 and the start and
cutbacks of the Bivens remedy that the New York Court of
Appeals decided Brown v. State of New York. 41 As previously
stated, the court held that the plaintiffs did have the right to seek
injuries were incident to military service); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305 (holding
that in discrimination suits, the unique disciplinary structure of the military and
Congress' activity in that field constitute special factors that prevent enlisted
personnel from seeking damages against superior officers for constitutional
violations).
41 See supra note 40
42 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
43 Id. at 486.
44Id.
45 Id. at 483.
46 Id. at 485.
47 Id. at 486.
48 89 N.Y.2d 172, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1996).
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damages in the Court of Claims for violations of their equal
protection and search and seizure rights under the New York
State Constitution.4 9
The facts underlying the case were fairly well publicized. The
case grew out of an investigation of an attack on an elderly
woman in upstate New York - Oneonta, New York.- The
complaint alleged that the police stopped and interrogated
"nonwhite" males who were found in the City of Oneonta.5' The
investigated residents brought the case as a class action in the
New York Court of Claims.2 In holding that the plaintiffs had
the right to seek damages for the alleged state constitutional
violations, the New York Court of Appeals relied very heavily
upon the Bivens decision, as well as upon those state court
decisions that have recognized claims for damages under various
Bill of Rights provisions of their state constitutions."
Again, this is an issue on which there has been sharp
disagreement among the state courts around the country. I think
that the basic theme of the New York Court of Appeals decision
in Brown is that State constitutional rights that can be violated by
state officials without remedial consequences are not meaningful
rights. And looking at it from the opposite perspective, I think
the court is saying that, by contrast, when the government
recognizes a claim for damages for violations of a constitutionally
protected right, the government puts its coercive power behind
that right. And the government, through the New York Court of
49 Id. at 188, 674 N.E.2d at 1138-39, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 232-33. N.Y.
CONST. art I, § 11 (stating in pertinent part that "No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof."); N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 12 (stating in pertinent part that "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause. .... ").
50Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 176, 674 N.E.2d at 1131, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
51 Id. at 174-75, 674 N.E.2d at 1131, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
5Id.
53 Id. at 195, 674 N.E.2d at 1143, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (stating that in
Brown, as distinguished from Bivens, the state waived its immunity for the
actions of the state's officers and employees).
1998
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Appeals, is announcing to the public that compliance regarding
these constitutional rights is expected.
In addition, the court found that the damages remedy for
violations of equal protection and search and seizure rights was
the most effective way to deter police misconduct.m I read that to
mean that now that the New York Court of Appeals has
recognized claims for damages for violations of search and
seizure and equal protection rights, a message is sent to law
enforcement officers in the State of New York. "You are
expected to comply with the equal protection and search and
seizure guarantees of the New York State Constitution."
Using the analogy to the Bivens case, the Court of Appeals
picked up on the point that, for individuals like Mr. Bivens and
the plaintiffs in Brown, who do not have an available remedy for
prospective relief, it is damages or nothing." In concluding that
the plaintiffs could seek damages in the Court of Claims, the New
York Court of Appeals found that the New York Court of Claims
Act56, which contains a waiver of New York State's sovereign
immunity, should be interpreted to waive the state's sovereign
immunity for state constitutional violations.Y The courts found no
way to meaningfully distinguish state constitutional torts from
common law torts in interpreting this sovereign immunity waiver.
What is the breadth of this waiver of sovereign immunity?
What is the extent of it? The waiver of sovereign immunity is not
only a waiver with respect to state government. It is also a
waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to municipal
government, so that municipalities are now subject to the Brown
m Id. at 194-95, 674 N.E.2d at 1142-43, 652 N.Y.S.2d 236-37.
55 Id. at 192, 674 N.E.2d 1141, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
56 Court Claims Act § (9)(2). This section of the Court of Claims Act
gives the Court of Claims jurisdiction:
[t]o hear and determine any claim of any person, corporation or
municipality against the state for the appropriation of any real or
personal property or any interest therein, for the breach of contract,
express or implied, for the torts of its officers or employees while
acting as such officers or employees ....
Id.
57Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 194, 674 N.E.2d at 1142, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
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remedy.m Let me point out that there is a big difference in New
York between suing the State of New York and suing a
municipality. A suit against the State of New York must be
brought in the New York Court of Claims, where there is no
right to trial by jury. On the other hand, a suit against a
municipality must be brought in the New York Supreme Court
where there is a right to trial by jury.
This waiver of sovereign immunity is a waiver of immunity for
compensatory damages.59 It does not waive the state or municipal
government's sovereign immunity for punitive damages. On the
other hand, the waiver of sovereign immunity contemplates
respondeat superior liability.w° What we are talking about is
liability imposed against the state, or liability imposed against
municipal government, based upon acts of state and local
employees that violate either the equal protection or search and
seizure provisions of the New York State Constitution.61
The New York Court of Appeals in Brown believed that this
was sound policy.6 For one thing, imposition of liability upon
state or local government on the basis of respondeat superior
will, one would hope, lead to better trained and better supervised
law enforcement officers.Y The New York Court of Appeals
rejected the rationale of the United States Supreme Court in FDIC
v. Meyer, which said that the Bivens claim could not be brought
against the government itself, In Meyer it was the federal
government. The Brown Court held that the state constitutional
claims do lie against the state and local government.6
The decision in Brown is analogous to Bivens in the sense that
each case represents a starting point in the development of the
law. In some ways that is very exciting. Of course, starting
581d. at 195, 674 N.E.2d at 1143, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
59 Id. at 194, 674 N.E.2d at 1142, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
60 Id. at 193, 674 N.E.2d at 1142, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
61 Id. at 194, 674 N.E.2d at 1142-43, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 236-37.
6 Id.
63Id. at 194-95, 674 N.E.2d at 1142-43, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 236-37.
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994).
5 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971).
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points often raise troubling and unresolved questions. Think back
to the Bivens case. In Bivens, the United States Supreme Court
established the basic right of an individual to sue a federal law
enforcement officer for monetary damages for violations of
Fourth Amendment rights,6 but it generated a host of unresolved
questions.
Let me just mention some of them. Bivens was a violation of
Fourth Amendment rights. How about other constitutionally
protected rights? How about free speech,67 freedom of religion,6
due process,6 equal protection 0 and so forth. Secondly, should
the Bivens claim for damages be recognized even though
Congress has perhaps created some type of alternative remedy
that gives the plaintiff an avenue of relief? What about
respondeat superior? We recognize the Bivens claim for relief,
but should the government be liable for the constitutional wrongs
of its employees? How about the statute of limitations? All the
procedural details have to be filled in. One could go on down the
line. What type of pleading requirements exist under Bivens?
66Id. at 394-95.
67 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech Clause states in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " Id.
68 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause states: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. . . ." Id.
69 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No state shall make or enforce any
laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." Id.
70 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any persons
within its jurisdiction of equal protection of the law." Id.
71 See Martin A. Schwartz, Recognizing Damage Suits Under New York
Constitution, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 18, 1997, at 3. This article discusses
significant new issues, such as whether claims for relief would be
recognized under other federal constitutional provisions; whether
Bivens claims could be asserted even though alternative avenues of
relief were available; whether Bivens liability could be based on
respondent superior; what is the governing limitations period;
668 [Vol 14
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Very significantly, how about the immunities of the officials who
are sued for Bivens violations?'
Like Bivens, Brown is a starting point. It is a starting point,
but it raises a host of unsettled questions. In Brown, we have the
New York Court of Appeals recognizing a claim for damages for
search and seizure and equal protection violations of the State
Constitution. But how about the other rights in the New York
State Constitution? The New York Court of Appeals in Brown
very carefully limited its decision to the particular rights that
were before the court.7Y The Court of Appeals did say that it
would only allow a claim for damages for violations of rights
protected by the State Constitution where the state constitutional
provision at issue is "self-executing." 74 What does that mean?
What do we mean by "self-executing?" Well, from the research
that I did, I think it means a provision of the Federal Constitution
that does not require any implementing legislation by the New
York State Legislature. But, at the same time, the Court of
Appeals in Brown said that New York State constitutional rights
are presumed to be "self-executing.""7 I think that there is going
to be a lot of litigation down the road regarding provisions of the
New York State Constitution - which are "self-executing" and
which are not?
I do not think that there is going to be a meaningful way to
distinguish the equal protection and search and seizure provisions
that were at issue in Brown7 from other types of positive New
York State constitutional rights that have counterparts in the
Federal Constitution. For example, take the free speech77 or
whether Bivens claims could be asserted against federal agencies;
what immunities may be asserted by Bivens defendants?
Id.
72id.
73 Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 196, 674 N.E.2d at 1144, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
74 Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 186, 674 N.E.2d at 1137, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
1 Id. (stating that "[iIn New York, constitutional provisions are
presumptively self-executing.").
76 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
77 N.Y. CONST. art. I. § 8. This section provides in pertinent part: "Every
citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjcts ...
1998
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freedom of religion78 provisions of the New York State
Constitution. It seems to me that these claims would be very
strong candidates for the Brown damages remedy. We should, by
analogy, look to how the Bivens doctrine developed. Remember,
the United States Supreme Court in Bivens did not focus on the
nature of the particular federal constitutional provision that was at
issue. It did not say that this case was different because it raised,
for example, a Due Process issue, as opposed to a Fourth
Amendment or an Eighth Amendment issue.
I think that the critical factor for the United States Supreme
Court in the Bivens line of cases has been what the Congress has
done. What has the legislative body done? Would the Supreme
Court's recognition of a new Bivens claim for damages somehow
interfere with, or interrelate with, the Congressional remedy?
There are other provisions of the New York State Constitution
that do not have counterparts in the Federal Constitution. In state
constitutional jargon, we call these provisions "unique
provisions."
For example, New York is one of the relatively few states that
has a provision in the state constitution placing a mandatory
obligation upon the state to provide assistance to the needy.7 9 In
New York, that provision is Article XVII of the New York
Constitution, 0 which has been the subject of many decisions of
the New York Court of Appeals attempting to define the extent of
this obligation.8 For present purposes, the important question is
and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the
press." Id.
78 N.Y. CONST. art. I. § 3. This section provides in pertinent part: "The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state to all
mankind .... " Id.
79 See ROBERT. F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 470 (2d ed. 1993).
80 N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. This section provides in pertinent part:
"The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be
provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and
by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine." Id.
81 See, e.g., Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 371 N.E.2d 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d
728 (1977). See also Bernstein v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 437, 373 N.E.2d 238, 402
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whether this part of the New York State Constitution is one of
those "self-executing" provisions? Only if it is "self-executing,"
will an individual be able to go into a New York State court and
say "You violated my Article XVII right to protect me as a needy
person, to give me assistance as a needy person, and now I am
seeking money damages."
This is an arguable point because the language in Article XVII,
on the one hand, provides that aid to the needy "shall be provided
by the state, and its subdivisions." But then there is a proviso
which says "in such manner and by such means as the legislature
may from time to time determine." I think that because of this
proviso there is at least an arguable point that this is not a "self-
executing" provision; I don't think it is clear cut either way.
Despite the proviso, maybe the basic right to assistance under
Article XVII is self-executing. We are going to have to see about
that. So that is one of the open issues.
Another very important issue is whether there are any
immunities that the state or municipality might be able to claim.
This is a tricky issue because the Court of Appeals in Brown said
that the Court of Claims waived the state's sovereign immunity.
But at the same time both the majority' and the dissenting
opinion in Brown4 acknowledged that the New York Court of
Appeals decisional law provides an immunity for quasi-judicial
and discretionary action by state and municipal officials in the
State of New York.5 I think one of the open questions is - how
does this immunity apply to claims for damages under the Brown
decision? It seems to me that if you read this immunity in an
expansive way, it has the real potential for eviscerating a good
part of the Brown remedy.
Another major issue left open pertains to damages under Brown
against the state or municipal official in the official's personal
N.Y.S.2d 342 (1977); Wilkie v. O'Connor, 261 A.D.2d 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d
617 (4th Dep't 1941).
2 Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 172, 674 N.E.2d at 1129, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
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capacity. Remember that Brown recognized the claim against
state and local government.86 But again, how about the personal
capacity claim? I think that this could be a very big issue when
you consider that punitive damages are not within the Court of
Claims' waiver of sovereign immunity. So the plaintiff who is
seeking money damages might say "I can't get punitive damages
against the state or local government because that is not
encompassed within the waiver of sovereign immunity; maybe I
can get punitive damages in a suit against the official who
engaged in the particular wrongdoing in that official's personal
capacity."
I think that it is very interesting that the law in the State of New
York starts in the exact opposite way that the Bivens doctrine
started in the United States Supreme Court. What do I mean by
that? In Bivens, the Court recognized the claim for damages
against the federal official in the official's personal capacity."
But there was a big issue that was left open. How about the
claim for damages against the federal agency that employed that
official?88 Remember, that remedy was ultimately denied in
FDIC v. Meyer. The Brown decision starts from the completely
opposite starting point.89 The Brown decision recognizes the
claim for damages against the State of New York,1° but leaves
open the claim for damages against the particular official. 91
I think that there is going to be exciting litigation over the next
ten or twenty years. It is going to be fascinating to watch how
the Brown doctrine develops. If we take lessons from Bivens
decisional law, it may be critical for whoever sits on the New
York Court of Appeals over the next ten or twenty years, whether
the damage remedy for state constitutional violations is regarded,
as Justice Brennan did in Bivens, as an ordinary remedy that is
principally the function of the judiciary to administer. Or will the
86Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 172, 674 N.E.2d at 1129, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
87 Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392
(1971).
88 Id.
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remedy be viewed as primarily a question for the legislature to
resolve as a matter of policy? When you put the issue that way,
it might not only be a question of judicial philosophy with respect
to remedies for constitutional violations. It might also be a
question of how the New York State Legislature reacts to the
decision in Brown, if it reacts at all.
Despite the numerous unresolved issues, Brown is a vital
precedent. It is New York's counterpart to Section 1983 and
Bivens, filling a very significant remedial vacuum. It "adds
teeth" to state constitutional violations and, in so doing, it
furthers the rule of law and thus makes the law meaningful.
Thank you very much.
Professor Latzer:
Thank you, Professor Schwartz. I want to thank all of our
speakers for their thought-provoking presentations.
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